The Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm, in conjunction with the one of smart cities, is pursuing toward the concept of smart buildings, i.e., "intelligent" buildings able to receive data from a network of sensors and thus to adapt the environment. IoT sensors can monitor a wide range of environmental features such as the energy consumption inside a building at fine-grained level (e.g., for a specific wall-socket). Some smart buildings already deploy energy monitoring in order to optimize the energy use for good purposes (e.g., to save money, to reduce pollution). Unfortunately, such measurements raise a significant amount of privacy concerns.
INTRODUCTION
The usage of electrical devices, ranging from appliances to digital systems, have constantly increased year after year. In order to cope with both rapidly growing demand and waste of electric power, future smart buildings will employ the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm to overcome many of the current facilities problems.
Researchers on smart building and smart grid have dramatically advanced the technology and the reading capabilities of smart energy meters (or simply smart meters). Moreover, smart meters are commercially available and their cost is decreasing, thus a widespread diffusion in the near future is very likely to happen. Smart meters are mainly of two types, based on the scope of the observed electrical network:
• household level sensors are usually embedded into the meter provided by the supply company and they are designed to monitor the entire building.
• wall-socket level sensors are deployed on individual sockets and they are distributed all over the building. The former type has already been considered by research on smart grids, also with respect to the possible privacy issues; public opinion seems aware of the topic as many news headlines report security and privacy issues. In this paper, we focus on privacy issues for the latter category of smart meters (i.e., wall-socket level sensors) and, supported by our results, we argue that it deserves more attention by the privacy research community. Some investigations worked to identify appliances [27] and their states [20] from energy traces, as well as to protect users, obfuscating their energy usage [13] . These works showed that energy usage data are privacy sensitive. Moreover, some appliances can be modeled as Finite State Machines (FSM) [12] , where the complexity increases with the number of transitions and possible states. Based on this fact, we observe that some devices consume energy depending on the specific configuration and user interaction. For example, a subset of the observable energy-states of a laptop is related with the user's actions.
A widespread diffusion of smart meters is expected in homes and offices, as well as public places such as bars and restaurants. Moreover, the demand of recharging batteries of portable devices in public places is increasing. Indeed, many public places (such as airport waiting areas) attract people as they supply both free energy and Internet connec-tion. Therefore, in order to gather information about their customers, they could deploy our system within a wall-socket monitoring system. We point out that some energy grid architectures have been specifically designed to enable the monitoring at the individual outlet level [14, 19] . For those reasons, in our study we consider laptops as personal mobile devices that are not replaced very often. Laptops consume electricity depending on many factors, mainly the way the user uses her laptop, running applications, its manufacturer and the operative system. Although all the aforementioned factors contributes to the observable energy consumption, defining a relationship between them is out of the scope of this paper. Thus, we consider the ensemble of laptop model, user activity and the set of applications installed and running, as a single entity (from now on referred as laptop-user ) to be identified.
Identifying a specific laptop-user from its energy traces could carry both significant benefits on smart building automation, as well as represents a serious threat to the privacy of users. Indeed, consumption data can be leveraged in several benevolent ways within a smart building. Such knowledge about users can bring several benefits to the Smart Buildings automation. For example, context-aware environments can automatically adjust themselves based on specific users and trigger predefined actions or services. On the other hand, an adversary able to retrieve energy traces from wherever they are stored (i.e., directly from sensors, or from the remote aggregation system such as a cloud platform) could represent a serious threat for the user privacy. Indeed, such adversary could infer the same knowledge about a user as a legitimate system could do. Moreover, after the creation of the user energy profile, the recognition can be extended to contexts like other buildings equipped with smart meters. This is the case in which data are collected by a unique meters manufacturer. Therefore, big smart meters firms might have a very wide scope within which to track laptop-users. For instance, a user profiled in her office can be tracked down when she plugs her laptop in public wall-sockets. This information could be then sold, beyond any still not present regulations, for marketing purposes.
The main risk of the preceding threats consists in turning a system that should help users to save energy in a powerful mass surveillance. While users appreciate the fancy consumption overviews provided by means of web pages or smartphone apps, their privacy is actually at risk and far from their direct control. The ubiquity of power sockets that can be possibly turned in energy consumption monitors suggests this technology can easily enter in our daily life. Moreover, we highlight that in countries with strict privacy regulations, the collection of such sensitive data would require users to accept appropriate Terms of Services. Furthermore, plugging more than one appliance in the same monitored wall-socket (for example using a power strip) might not be effective in order to hide the single appliance usage. Indeed literature shows that it is feasible to disaggregate the energy consumption per-appliance [18] . Lastly, countermeasures are non-trivial and not yet commercially available, we discuss them in Section 6.
Contributions -In this paper we introduce MTPlug, our proposed framework for the identification of a user solely relying on her laptop energy traces. We have built and tested MTPlug with the energy traces produced by the laptops of 27 users. In what follow, we list the main contributions this paper to the state-of-the-art:
• We demonstrate that it is possible to build a laptop-user specific energy fingerprint using a common low-frequency smart meter at the wall-socket level.
• We propose and fully implemented MTPlug framework, and evaluate its performance in terms of precision and recall with a thorough set of experiments.
• We study the influence of energy traces collection time for building a reliable laptop-user electrical fingerprint. Such fingerprint can be used afterwards to rapidly reidentify a laptop-user with an accuracy above 80%. This work makes a new contribution to the state of the art, since it highlights the existence, and the significance, of a new serious privacy threat in smart metering, and more generally, in anonymity of energy consumption data.
Organization -The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the state-of-the-art related to our research topic. In Section 3, we introduce required background knowledge. In Section 4, we present our framework MTPlug, describing its components. We evaluate the performance of our solution in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss possible countermeasures against the showed issue. Finally, in Section 7 we draw some conclusions and point out ways to further extend this work.
RELATED WORK
In this section, we survey the main researches in smart metering, considering different scopes and categories: smart metering privacy issues, appliance identification and user presence detection.
Smart metering privacy issues -Quinn et al. [24] review existing laws and regulations in smart metering and raise significant privacy questions. Furthermore, existing laws which protect user data suffer of weaknesses and possible exceptions about its usage and transfer to third party entities. However, the literature has different proposals for privacypreserving metering data transmission [10, 3] . On the user perspective, protection can be achieved using a rechargeable battery and a power routing algorithm [15] . In particular, it is possible to shape the home load signature to hide traces of appliances usage. Genkin et al. [11] show a side-channel attack able to reconstruct cryptographic keys based on fluctuations of the "ground" electric potential. Although the state of the art raises question about wall-socket level privacy, to the best of our knowledge our work is the first on users recognition through their laptop energy consumption.
Appliance identification -Literature shows that it is possible to perform appliance identification observing the energy consumption from different network levels. Non-intrusive load monitoring (NILM) approaches use a centralized sensor, usually located at the main house hold circuit-level. After collecting energy usage data, they perform information disaggregation to isolate single appliances traces [31] . Reinhardt et al. [26] use a more intrusive approach, considering single appliances and sampling the energy consumption from the power plug. Using a period of one second, the authors achieved good performances in recognizing, beside others, a laptop. Anyway, commercial services that implement NILM are already publicly available 1 .
User presence detection -Building occupancy is studied by users detection leveraging on data provided by sensors deployed in smart buildings [17] . For example, Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems usage can reveal user presence with a true positive rate above 88% [9] and highlight possible energy wasting [2] . While HVAC activity is observed from a centralized sensor, low-power appliances monitoring requires a more invasive approach. Their state recognition is performed in [32] which scores a F-measure (β = 1) of 0.906 and 0.804 for binary and multi-state appliances. However, since combinations of capacitive and inductive loads monitoring are more difficult to monitor, [31] warns to carefully evaluate such cases.
Going towards user profiling, our survey considers tools that gather, on different levels, energy data about appliance usage, focusing on computers. It is possible to inspect via software the power impact of single processes with negligible overhead [21] . Do et al. [8] use energy consumption features of operating systems to study the amount of energy consumed by each running application. Rashidi et al. [25] propose a semi-supervised approach to build behavioral patterns of users during an extended period (i.e., two weeks). Despite this work seems very similar to ours, the authors consider the aggregated consumption of multiple appliances used by individuals. Although it is a user level profiling, it considers consumption of un-labeled devices. Furthermore, Procaccianti et al. in [23] collected energy data from a computer system performing common usage scenarios (e.g., idle, web navigation, Skype call). Results show that software use cases impact significantly on energy consumption. Similarly, the authors of [6] show the feasibility of identifying specific web-browsing activities, using as a side channel the alternate current (AC) gathered at the power outlet level. The consumption analysis achieves very high precision and recall on determining which page is loaded.
Although related work achieve good results in user level analysis, the focus is mainly on behavioral patterns or other general inspections. In this paper we present a comprehensive laptop-users profiling and recognition based on energy consumption. Strong of our ground truth with respect to users and monitored laptops characteristics, we push the user monitoring toward a fine-grained level that seems missing in the literature.
BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE
In this section, we recall background aspects that we use in this paper. Firstly, we first introduce the electrical quantities considered. Secondly, we explain the time series segmentation. Then, we briefly describe some machine learning and data mining concepts. Finally, we illustrate the filtering of noisy signals. We point interested reader to references cited in this section for a more in depth study of specific concepts.
Electrical quantities -A wall-socket smart meter is able to measure the energy consumption of the plugged appliance. Such appliances drain AC from the electrical system of the household. In particular, such device measures several electrical quantities. The electrical quantities listed below are the ones used in this paper:
• Active Power (P ), also referred with real power, is expressed in watt (W).
• Reactive Power (Q) is often measured in reactive voltamperes (var).
• RMS Current (I) is the root mean square of the alternate current, measured in amperes (A).
• Phase Angle (φ) between the current and the voltage in the AC domain. In this paper, we consider wall-socket smart meters able to measure (at least) the values of these four electrical quantities for each sampling period. Hence, an energy trace consists of a multivariate time series of electrical values of sequential samples.
Time series segmentation -We consider a time series T = {x k = [x1, x2, ..., xn] | 1 k N } as a finite set of N samples indexed by time points t1, ..., tN [1] , and a segment as a set of consecutive time points S(a, b) = a k b, xa, xa+1, ..., x b . Hence, the segmentation of the time series T into c non-overlapping intervals can be formulated as S c T = {Se(ae, be) | 1 e c}, were a1 = 1, bc = N and ae = be−1 + 1. In order to use a time series as a pattern, the series can be represented by Piecewise Linear Representation (PLR), which consists in segmenting a series with K straight segments. Since PLR results in an approximation of T , its fidelity can be expressed by error metrics (e.g., max err , total error ) which can consider multiple units of the PLR: from individual segments to the entire segmented series. In general, researchers propose three segmentation approaches [16] that produce a representation of a time series T given: (i) the number K of segments; (ii) a max err threshold, which stands for the error bound a single segment cannot exceed; and (iii) a total error threshold among all segments of T . In this paper, we applied the second approach to segment the time series obtained by laptop energy traces.
Supervised learning -Supervised machine learning algorithms acquire knowledge about a specific context through examples. After the training phase, where such algorithms make up their knowledge from past experience, they produce an inferred model able to classify new un-labeled instances. In an optimal test scenario, the algorithm determines properly the class labels for unseen instances. In this paper, we employ three classification methods: Random Forest (RF) ensemble classifier, k -Nearest Neighbors (KNN) and Support Vector Machine (SVM). A comprehensive reading about these classifiers is available in [5] .
Savitzky-Golay filter -In the sampling of an analog signal, sensors may produce noisy readings. With high frequency fluctuations, this error is more likely to grow and the segmentation could end in meaningless chunks. For this reason, a sampled signal could be smoothed using a low-pass filter without harming the original signal structure. SavitzkyGolay [28] is a low-pass filter very effective in smoothing out highly noisy signals characterized by a wide frequency spectrum. It considers the frame size as a parameter, and it must be tuned considering the degree of variance and noise [30] . Savitzky-Golay filters are optimal as low-pass because they preserve the high-frequency content of the signal and they minimize the amount of noise reduction intended as the fitting least-squares error.
OUR FRAMEWORK: MTPlug
In this section, we describe the design of MTPlug, our framework to identify laptop-users from their energy traces. We divide the overview of the proposed system MTPlug in two blocks: dataset creation (in Section 4.1) and classification (in Section 4.2).
Dataset creation
In the first block, the system acquires the raw data and prepares it in order to be handled by a supervised learning method. This block is composed of four steps, summarized in Figure 1 . The first step, named Data Collector, consists of acquiring the raw energy traces of the laptop-users plugged into wall-socket smart meters (Section 4.1.1). The second step is the pre-process of the raw data (Section 4.1.2) and it is in charge to prepare a time series that could be divided in segments in the third step (Section 4.1.3) . Then, as last step of the first block (dataset creation), the system extracts an array of statistical features from each segment (Section 4.1.4).
Data Collector
Data pre-processing Segmentation Feature extraction 
In this step, MTPlug system relies on wall-socket smart meters to collect the energy traces produced by laptop-users. These smart devices are able to build an energy trace composed of several electrical quantities such as Active Power, RMS Current, Reactive Power and Phase Angle. Since the sampling period is fixed for each electrical quantity (e.g., one second), an energy trace can be handled as a multivariate time series. To build a reliable ground truth, we assigned a wall-socket to a single user, thus the system is able to relate that user with her energy trace.
Pre-processing
The pre-processing phase consists of filtering out the samples that are not relevant or that could hinder the segmentation of the time series. First, the system filters the samples that are meaningful to perform the user identification. Indeed, the system takes into account only the samples likely reporting actual user activity. In order to do so, MTPlug considers only readings with an Active Power value above a certain α threshold. Doing this, the system drops the samples of when no useful load is plugged (e.g., only the power supplier, laptop in stand-by mode). In Section 5.1, we report how we empirically determine α threshold. Secondly, we filter the samples that contain reading errors, thus they could hinder the time series segmentation. To do so, we smooth the time series using a Savitzky-Golay low-pass filter (previously described in Section 3), to preserve the original signal structure. At the end of this pre-processing phase, the time series are ready to be segmented.
Segmentation
After selecting only useful samples from the raw data, MTPlug applies the segmentation to the multivariate time series. In the time series classification, the choice of a proper segmentation approach for a specific domain is fundamental to split the series in meaningful patterns. Many approaches are possible, for instance change-point detection, sliding window, top-down and bottom-up [4, 16] . We employ the latter which starts from a fine series approximation and iteratively merges the lowest cost pair of segments until a stopping criteria is met [16] . We aim to segment the consumption data such that each segment represents a particular pattern in the laptop usage. Differently from the PLR, we just detect segments endpoints considering the Active Power, keeping the original data points of the series. Since the segmentation is based on a straight lines approximation, we find them by linear interpolation, which consists in approximating the subsequence T [a : b] by connecting ta and t b [16] . Hence, to evaluate the quality of the approximation, we use the Residual Sum of Squares (RSS) as distance metric. RSS is the sum of all the vertical squared differences between the best-fit line and the actual data, a small value means that the model fits tightly. We merge two adjacent segments if the RSS is below a given maximum error, in the following referred as max err. This parameter controls the outcome segments length so we empirically tune it to achieve an optimal representation of our domain, we give further details of the distribution of lengths in Section 5.1. We underline that the segmentation is used just to identify the endpoints of segments, thereby we build our pre-processed dataset using the values of the original sampled time series.
Features extraction
This step produces a statistical data set which a classifier algorithm can handle. At the end of the segmentation phase, we obtain segments (i.e., multivariate time series) with variable lengths. To build a dataset suitable for a classifier, we extract a fixed number of features from each segment. Since a segment is a set of four time series (i.e., one for each electrical quantity), we extract the following statistical features from each serie: mean, minimum and maximum values; sum of the values; length of the segment; variance, standard deviation, mean absolute deviation, skewness, kurtosis and variance. Moreover, we also calculate the value that corresponds to the n th percentile of a series. For each segment, we concatenate the resulting four arrays of statistical features, obtaining a single array of data. In order to simplify the classification execution, we normalize from 0 to 1 the values for each statistical feature. Finally, we label each segment with the identifier of the laptop-user which has produced that segment (e.g., user0, user1). At the end of this step, we obtain a labeled dataset of examples.
Laptop-users classification
In the second block (classification), the system uses the dataset created in the previous block to first train a classifier and then to evaluate its performance. As we previously introduced in Section 3, in a supervised learning a classi-fier needs a labeled set of examples to be trained upon (i.e., training set) and another one to test its performance (i.e., test set). Training set and test sets must be disjointed, i.e., they do not share any element. In fact, the test set does not take part in the training of the classifier. In our case, an example is composed of the array of statistical features and an identifier (i.e., class) of an laptop-user (e.g., user0, user1).
Before proceeding with the training, MTPlug runs first a features selection and then a hyperparameters optimization. Since our feature space consists of 109 statistical features, the classification could be affected by a phenomenon known as curse of dimensionality [5] . In order to avoid this phenomenon, the system evaluates the significance of each statistical feature running Random Forest classifier on the training set. Thus, it selects the feature with a significance score higher than 1% (see Section 5.2). Afterward, the system selects the optimum set of hyperparameters of the classifier. To do so, it runs an exhaustive search on a wide set of hyperparameters applying a grid-search algorithm with 5-fold cross-validation (CV). Such algorithm iteratively evaluates the performance of a classifier for each possible instance of hyperparameters. For each instance, it runs a cross validation on five disjoint and equipotent sets of the training set (i.e., 5-fold). Finally, MTPlug trains a classifier using the whole training set and the set of hyperparameters that achieved the best results in the cross validation. In Section 5.2, we evaluate classification performance on the test set of three classifiers: Support Vector Machine (SVM), kNearest Neighbors (KNN) and Random Forest (RF).
A classifier predicts the class to which a segment belongs and the probability (confidence) for that prediction. In order to increase the overall performance, we consider only segment predictions above a threshold ω. Note that this approach does not assume any class membership on the stream flow basis. However, since we employ supervised learning, the test phase assures the reliability of high-confidence predictions. We refer to this process as the classification confidence post-process function. By this, we aim to profile a laptop-user when plugged in a specific wall-socket for a reasonable time so we rely on more than a single segment. Thus, we consider only the segments to which the classifier has a confidence above a certain threshold (i.e., ω), and simply discarding the others. Unfortunately, a side effect of this approach is that the increasing of ω, the number of segments considered as reliable reduces accordingly.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present our testbed configuration for data collection and the performance evaluation of MTPlug. In particular, we detail our testbed in Section 5.1, while we report the outcomes of the classification in Section 5.2.
Test-bed configuration and data collection
In our settings, we monitored the energy consumption of laptop-users using wall-socket smart meters with a sampling period of one second. Each sample is composed of the user label and an array of real-valued readings of Active and Reactive Power as well as RMS Current and Phase Angle. The data collection environment is an office room with 230 Volts and 50 Hz monitored power sockets.
Participants -Our data collection involved a total of 27 participants with their personal laptops. All the participants were volunteers, without any promise of reward, and they signed an informed agreement. In particular, we asked seven participants to work in a restricted office for a period of two weeks. Henceforth, we refer to those seven user as main users. The intruders are represented by a disjoint set of the remaining 20 users which were not supposed to plug their laptops within the restricted area. Their participation lasted just a few hours, since we aim to simulate several unauthorized accesses. Considered laptops are of seven famous brands, all commercially available.
Energy trace collection -We deploy off-the-shelf meters Plogg.zbg v2.0 (1 Hz sampling rate) that integrate a TelosB 2 for remote management. These devices are designed to arrange hierarchical WSNs where IoT nodes (i.e., smart meters) sample data and gateways collect and forward it to the upper levels, for processing purposes. This approach has been successfully adopted in bigger testbeds [22] . We set up this environment in order to gather the energy consumption related to different laptop-users. Before segmenting the time series, the pre-processing step includes the dropping of those samples with Active Power value below a threshold α (see Section 4.1.2). We empirically determine the threshold α = 12 Watt by observing that under this value, all monitored laptops were plugged in but no significant user activity was observable (e.g., stand-by or low-energy mode). Lastly, we perform the time series smoothing by a quadratic polynomial Savitzky-Golay low-pass filter. A preliminary analysis shows that a frame size of 30 points is a reasonable value to avoid noisy and scattered readings.
Segments lengths -The time series bottom-up segmentation algorithm produces segments with different lengths. Given n data points and K segments, the average segment length is L = n/K [16] . The lengths of segments vary with the parameters of the segmentation algorithm (i.e., max err, RSS, interpolation function). In this paragraph we focus on max err, which determines the merging of two adjacent segments, hence influencing the output segments lengths. Thus, we tune the max err parameter in order to obtain reasonable segments lengths. For this reason, we set two additional bounds on the length of the segments produced by the segmentation algorithm. On one hand, we fixed the lower bound of segments length to three samples (i.e., three seconds), hence, we simply ignore segments that last less than three samples. A preliminary analysis showed that segments with length smaller than this value appear to be very heterogeneous, and therefore more likely to decrease the classification accuracy. On the other hand, we set an upper limit in order to avoid extremely long segments. Indeed, long segments are due to a stable (almost-constant) energy consumption for many sequential samples. In our analysis, the aforementioned case is meaningless since it does not show any substantial activity, which might helps the classification. For this reason, we filter out the segments longer than the 90-percentile. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the segments lengths varying the max err, considering all 27 users. The plot shows that as the max err segmentation parameter increases, the segments lengths grow as well.
Classification Performance
The examples produced by data collection are divided in two disjoint sets: training set and test set. We use the training set to train the classifier, while we use the test set to evaluate its accuracy. They consists of the 75% and the 25% of the whole data set [5] , respectively. In our analysis, we aim to train a classifier that is able to recognize the main users from the segmented energy traces (i.e., time series) produced by their laptops. Moreover, this classifier has to be able to discriminate each main user from the intruders. As motivated in Section-5.1, all the examples collected from intruders are considered as a single class. In the following, we firstly investigate the performance of the classifiers considering different sets of electrical quantities and different values of max err. We discuss the results obtained with the best scoring setting for each considered classifier. In particular, we discuss the average accuracy reached in recognizing laptop-users, and give detailed results for precision, recall and F-measure (β = 1) metrics. Later, we investigate how to improve classification performance relying on confidence threshold ω. Finally, we investigate the performance of the best classifier as the dimension of the training set changes, thus the number of segments necessary to build the energy fingerprint of a laptop-user.
First, we investigated the contribution given by each electrical quantity to the classification of laptop-users. In order to do so, we ran the MTPlug framework on different combinations of the collected electrical quantities and for a set of max err values ranging from 0.005 to 5. We obtained the highest classification performance considering all the electrical quantities and max err =0.005. Hence, we use these settings for our classification, achieving the 85% of accuracy, and the mean length of a segment is just four seconds. Indeed, increasing the max err increases also the mean length of segments, as reported in Figure 2 .
In the following, we focus our attention on the evaluation of different classifiers: Random Forest (RF), k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) and Support Vector Machine (SVM). In our analysis, we use a popular machine learning library best max err and electrical quantities combination obtained from the previous analysis. In Figure 3 , we compare the performance of three classifiers in this experiment. Random Forest outperforms k-Nearest Neighbors and Support Vector Machine on all the considered metrics. Hyperparameters for the RF obtained from the grid-search are 150 estimators, maxf eatures = sqrt and the Gini impurity measure as split criterion. Figure 3 : Classifiers performance comparison considering the main users and the intruders.
As we previously explained in Section 4.2, considering all the statistical features extracted from a time series segments could affect the classification performance with the curse of dimensionality. In fact, from each segment, we extract its length as well as the features detailed in Section 4.1.4, for a total of 109 features. In order to consider only the most relevant features, we perform a feature selection relying on the feature importance score calculated by a RF classifier over the training set. We selected only the statistical features with an importance score higher than 1%. Considering the best settings, we obtained a total of 36 features of the original 109.
Classification confidence analysis -In order to increase the classification performances, we used the post-processing function that relies on classification confidence, introduced in Section 4.2. This function considers the classifier confidence of each prediction. Figure 4 depicts the obtained performance using different ω. In this analysis, we consider our framework using the RF classifier, all the electrical quantities, max err =0.005, and the training and test sets with all the seven main users and the twenty intruders. The results obtained with the RF classifier highlight that the classification confidence mean in the test set is µ = 0.82 with standard deviation σ = 0.19. The classifier achieves an Fmeasure equal to 0.98 in predicting 49.6% of the whole test set, with a confidence ω = 0.9. Unfortunately, this postprocessing function decreases the amount of classified segments by a ≈ 0.5 factor. In order to deal with this loss, we point out that the segmentation (see Section 4.1.3) should use a max err as small as possible, since this would significantly increase the total number of examples. Experiments in this section use max err = 0.005.
Sufficient monitoring time -In order to evaluate the feasibility of producing an energy fingerprint in a limited time, we investigate on the sufficient monitoring time for training our MTPlug framework. The time evaluation is based on the statistical length distribution of the considered segments showed in Figure 2 . In this analysis, we consider the max err = 0.005, which has mean segments length µ = 4.6, standard deviation σ = 2 and 75-percentile = 5 seconds. tri = ni × µ. Each of the n experiments is ran 25 times with different training sets (shuffled subsets of the entire training set) and evaluated on the same test set used in previous analysis. Figure 5 shows the average scores for the Random Forest classifier, the best classifier so far. From this, we show that the sufficient monitoring time to recognize our main users and intruders with F-measure = 70% is on average around tr0 = 7.5 minutes, considering the 75-percentile we can compute an a training upper bound as 8.3 minutes. On one hand, we achieve an F-measure above 80% starting from 2650 segments, in this case the upper bound of the training time is around 3.5 hours. On the other hand, for the same amount of training time, we achieve an F-measure of 88% and 97%, with ω = 0.6 and ω = 0.9, respectively. We recall that these results are obtained by solely observing the consumption of the ensemble of user activity and their machines. Although it is speculative to attribute samples to specific events within the laptop-user entity, we stress the fact that each monitored configuration is, as a whole, rather different. 
POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES
As possible countermeasures, we suppose that both hardware and software systems can be employed in order to hide a laptop-user recognition through her energy traces analysis. Researchers propose configurations based on rechargeable batteries connected to the house electricity meter able to reduce the sensitive information leak by obfuscating the actual power usage [15] . Moreover, a software countermeasure might try to shape the energy drain from the AC by controlling the battery usage in order to alter the observable consumption pattern. In [29] , authors propose a cloud based battery control client. Although this solution might be effective against MTPlug, we argue that is not directly generalisable to the whole laptop domain because it is based on specific brand's system utilities. We recall that our identification method works only when laptops are plugged to a power socket.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we show that the analysis of energy consumption data might be a serious threat for the privacy of users. We perform and evaluate such analysis in a controlled environment using off-the-shelf smart meters and supervised machine learning. In particular, we design and implement MTPlug, a framework to fingerprint and recognize a user based on her laptop energy consumption. We design an automatic statistical feature extraction and selection procedure which considers multiple electrical quantities. In performing this task, the Random Forest classifier outperformed the k-Nearest Neighbors and the Support Vector Classifier. We carried out an analysis which shows the feasibility to identify a pair laptop-user with an accuracy of 86%. In addition to that, the classification accuracy raises to 98% applying a classification confidence post-processing function, with a properly selected threshold (i.e., ω = 0.9) that filters out uncertainly predicted examples (around one every two). Given these facts, we strongly believe that, with ω properly tuned, the performance of MTPlug will remain stable when the number of laptop-users increases, against an increasing number of uncertainly predicted examples filtered out. We also investigated the impact of a single and combined electrical quantities in laptop-users classification. We point out that it is relatively easy to profile a laptop-user. In fact, even collecting not contiguous energy traces for a total amount of less than a 3.5 hours are sufficient to build an effective laptop-user energy fingerprint. Our findings show laptop energy traces have to be considered as sensitive information because they expose the user to threats to her privacy such as identification or position tracking.
As a future work, we intend further investigate the impact on energy consumption traces of laptop model, set of the applications installed and user habits. Another possible future work could consist of inferring the actions performed by a user with her laptop (e.g., watching a movie, surfing the web), similarly to what has been recently done for smartphone apps relying on network traffic analysis [7] . Lastly, we plan to expand this research by considering a broader set of users.
